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Recent increases in transnational social movement activity lead to questions about 
whether this kind of activity can persist and grow, given the challenges of mobilizing 
people and resources across wide physical, political, and cultural distances.   Data from 
the Yearbook of International Associations show that, since the mid-1980s, a larger 
percentage of transnational social movement organizations were organized within either 
the global North or South than was true in the past, when most groups organized across 
the North-South divide.  I explore two different explanations for this organizational 
pattern.  One might interpret the regionalization of transnational organizing as a result of 
the failures of prior organizing efforts to overcome the North-South polarization that 
divides the international community.  Alternatively, regionalization might reflect 
activists’ efforts to take advantage of institutional openings in order to maximize their 
influence in global political arenas.  I analyze ties between regionally organized 
transnational social movement organizations and other non-governmental organizations 
to assess the extent to which transnational organizations relate to groups within or outside 
their own regions.  Groups in the global South were more likely than their Northern 
counterparts to maintain cross-regional ties.  At the same time, Northern groups were 
significantly more likely to report only regional ties.  Environmental and women’s 
organizations were the most likely to maintain only regional ties while economic justice 
and human rights organizations were the most likely to report cross-regional ties.  These 
findings best support the argument that the regionalization of transnational social change 
organizations signals their adaptation to the institutional environment rather than 
polarization.   
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 The increased prevalence and importance of transnational political protest is 
beyond dispute, and extensive attention has been paid to the rapidly growing numbers of 
transnational social change organizations and transnational protest events (See, e.g., della 
Porta and Tarrow 2005;Anheier et al. 2004).  Indeed, there is strong evidence that the 
explosion of transnational organizing has significantly impacted the dynamics of global 
decisionmaking, and it has also shaped the operations of regional and global institutions 
(Glasius 2002; Friedman, Clark, and Hochstetler Forthcoming; Khagram, Riker, and 
Sikkink 2002; Willetts 1996).   
 Nevertheless, analysts still question whether social change advocates can develop 
and maintain the transnational ties required to mobilize sustained challenges to global 
elites (e.g., Tarrow 2001; Forthcoming; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002).  After all, 
activists must work in the places in which they live, and their possibilities for doing 
transnational work will be constrained by the resources and political conditions of their 
local and national contexts.  For most activists, it is far easier to collaborate with people 
in close geographic proximity who share a common language and cultural or professional 
context than it is to move beyond these bounds.  Even with new technologies that enable 
more rapid communication and transportation, it seems reasonable to expect that 
organizers can more readily build trust and foster cooperative relations locally than 
transnationally. 
 At the same time, the expanding numbers and significance of international 
political and economic agreements require that activists work together in order to face 
much stronger, global adversaries.  Also, understanding the nature of threats posed by 
global political and economic integration requires dialogue across diverse groups.  
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Moreover, as governments turn increasingly to international forums to address a growing 
array of problems, they create opportunities and incentives for social movements to look 
outside national borders in search of allies.  So while physical and perhaps political 
barriers might work to limit transnational cooperation, there are strong factors pulling 
activists into global level political arenas (see, e.g., Young 1992).   
 This article examines the population of transnationally organized social 
movement organizations (TSMOs) for evidence about whether this population appears to 
be expanding or declining in the face of competing pressures from global and local 
sources.  By looking at how the numbers and organizational structures of TSMOs has 
changed over time, we can better identify what are the most important factors shaping 
global political change.  In particular, we can begin to assess whether the recent wave of 
transnational political protest is an anomaly that will recede back into local and national 
political spaces, or whether it is linked to ongoing processes of global integration and 
therefore an enduring and expanding feature of political life. 
 
The Population of TSMOs 
Data from the Yearbook of International Associations show that the population of 
TSMOs continued to grow during the 1990s, but that its rate of growth was considerably 
slower than that of prior years (Smith 2004).   So the overall numbers of groups continues 
to rise, but at a rate of about half that of the 1980s.  We also see a change in the way 
groups are organizing transnationally.  Specifically, by the late 1990s, more groups were 
drawing members from within particular regions of the world rather than building ties 
among activists across major global divides.  This was especially true among those 
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groups formed after 1985 than among more established organizations.  Specifically, more 
TSMOs were organized within the global North or South than was true in the past, when 
the vast majority of groups crossed this regional divide.  
 In their analysis of the more general category of international non-governmental 
organization (INGOs), Boli and Thomas (1999) also found a growing tendency in recent 
years for these groups to organize along regional lines.  They explained that regional 
organizing enjoyed the "practical advantages of shared language, culture, and history as 
tools for mobilization with respect to the larger world" (1999: 31).  In their view, the 
broader world culture and its institutional artifacts define an overarching framework 
within which “world culture authorizes and compels organization at diverse levels" 
(1999: 31-2).  As a sub-set of INGOs devoted explicitly to promoting social or political 
change, TSMOs can be expected to follow similar organizational logics.  While various 
regional categorizations are possible, this analysis uses the North-South division to 
distinguish between the “core” of the global economic and political order (the North) and 
the “periphery” states, which are concentrated in the global South.  This North-South 
divide is the major cleavage in major global policy debates, and the historical experiences 
and interests of each region differ in ways that are likely to affect political mobilization.   
 The tendency towards regionalization of TSMO structures is most pronounced in 
the global North, but the regionalization pattern holds for the South as well.  About a 
third of all TSMOs were organized within either the global North or the South in 2000, 
whereas this figure was around one-fifth of all groups in 1973.  There has been a parallel 
decline in the percentages (though not the overall numbers) of groups that organize 
across North and South.  Comparisons of the mean age of groups that were intra-regional 
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versus trans-regional confirm this pattern.  Seventy-two percent of TSMOs formed before 
1990, and just 47% of groups formed after 1989, were trans-regional.  The mean age of 
intra-regional groups was 18, while the age of trans-regional groups was 32.1  Between 
1985 and 1995, the population of regional groups doubled while that of trans-regional 
groups grew by just over one third. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Although the number of intra-regional groups is growing more quickly than that of trans-
regional groups, the absolute number of trans-regional groups continues to grow, albeit at 
a slower rate than was true before the mid-1980s.  Thus, we cannot say that regional 
organizations are completely displacing more universal ones.  Rather, it is likely to 
suggest important changes in the dynamics of this organizational population.   
 Analyses of organizational populations have found a consistent pattern of 
organizational foundings that responds to different pressures or incentives in the 
environment (Johnson and McCarthy 2005; Minkoff 1995).  In the early phases of the 
rise of a new organizational population, one tends to see few new organizational 
foundings.  However, as the population size expands, the rate of new foundings grows 
much more rapidly, as that organizational form becomes established and legitimated.  
This growth continues until the formation of new groups begins to outstrip the 
availability of resources and members needed for organizational survival.  At this 
saturation point, the number of new foundings each year declines in response to this more 
intense competition for scarce resources (see Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and 
                                                 
1 T-tests of mean differences were significant at the .01 level (2-tailed tests).   
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Carroll 1992; Minkoff 1995).  While the trans-regional forms of transnational organizing 
might be in the latter phase of this curve, we may be seeing the rise of a new, intra-
regional transnational organizational form in response to a changing political 
environment. 
 While dynamics internal to the population of social movements themselves might 
tell us part of the story, we must also consider how the external environment may be 
affecting organizing patterns.  A number of such explanations emerge from popular and 
scholarly discussions.  The first account holds that regionalization indicates a failure on 
the part of more universal, trans-regional groups to successfully bridge the structural 
differences in interests, experiences, and cultures that characterize their diverse 
memberships.  Attempts to cultivate a global civil society around a set of shared values, 
assumptions, and strategies may have triggered defensive responses from local and 
regional groupings.  Benjamin Barber (1995) calls this kind of response “jihad,” 
describing a range of different, defensive localisms (with Islamic fundamentalism being 
just one example) that has arisen as individuals struggle to maintain the familiar identities 
and communities that are challenged by globalizing forces, which Barber calls 
“McWorld.” This scenario would lead us to expect a growing polarization among 
transnational social movement organizations along the major structural divide in the 
world system.2  It would signal that social movement actors have been unable to mitigate 
or overcome the major lines of inequality in the global system in order to forge alliances.  
Activists may be finding their local or regional interests threatened within broad-based 
                                                 
2 Glasius and Kaldor (2002) offer a more elaborated categorization of groups in relation to globalization 
processes.  Their category of “rejectionists” parallels Barber’s “jihad,” although they and their collaborators 
apply the term somewhat differently from Barber, using it to describe more narrowly defined debates, such 
as those over particular trade agreements, rather than in the universalizing manner of Barber.   
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groups, leading them to pursue more locally defined goals by reinforcing alliances within 
their respective regions.   
 There is some evidence to support this kind of argument.  For instance, in an 
analysis of the entire population of TSMOs I found that Southern-based organizations 
were more likely than their Northern counterparts to organize around broad, multi-issue 
frames.  The greater tendency of Southern groups to work within multi-issue frameworks 
suggests that such groups tend to favor a different strategic orientation from their 
Northern counterparts.  Whereas Northern organizations might prefer to organize around 
single-issues for the purposes of political expediency, Southern activists may see such 
compartmentalized approaches as avenues that avoid addressing fundamental conflicts 
over power and access to resources.   
 For instance, among human rights groups we find a tendency of Northern activists 
to focus on political and civil rights and seek to defend and advance the legal structures 
that help promote these.  In contrast, Southern activists – while not opposed to promoting 
the legal defense of civil and political rights—have a harder time separating the economic 
and political dimensions of human rights.  They prefer to advocate a “right to 
development,” despite the considerable political and legal obstacles to achieving such a 
goal (see, e.g., Smith et al. 1998; Smith 2002; Steiner 1991).  A long-time scholar and 
activist from the global South, Walden Bello, makes a similar observation about these 
differences in how Northern and Southern activists frame their struggles with regard to 
global trade debates.  While Northern activists are more open to the idea of expanding 
global trade rules to include environmental and labor regulations, Southerners want no 
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part of an effort to expand the jurisdiction of an already very powerful and Northern-
controlled regime (Bello 2001).3   
 While polarization may indeed be explaining some of this shift towards regional-
level organizing, a look at the existing research and case studies of transnational activism 
suggests some alternative explanations.  For instance, much of the literature identifies 
important ways that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) channel or otherwise 
influence activities of transnational citizens’ groups (Friedman et al. forthcoming; Tarrow 
2003; Willetts 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  Thus, the regionalization of TSMOs 
might be a response to developments in inter-governmental organizations.  IGOs serve as 
focal points, and they create opportunities and obstacles that affect how movement actors 
mobilize and otherwise engage in collective action.  They do so in a number of ways.  
First, they can grant or deny legitimacy to actors through formal and informal 
certification processes, such as the United Nation’s arrangement for “Consultative 
Status” for non-governmental organizations.  Second, they help broker relationships 
among political actors—such as activists, government delegates, and IGO officials and 
staff-- who otherwise would not interact.  Third, they establish and reinforce norms that 
allow challengers to gain leverage through the use of what Keck and Sikkink have called 
“symbolic politics.”  Sometimes the correspondence between the aims of international 
organizations and social movements is so close that they generate durable alliances 
                                                 
3 This difference between the North and South could also be explained by population ecology theories, 
where a core idea is that the organizing contexts of the North and South create different patterns of 
organizational competition and cooperation in these diverse regions.  For instance, several contributors to 
Rootes’s (2004) compendium on environmental protest in Western Europe found that more recently 
emerging political issues attracted a more diverse collection of movement groups with a wide array of issue 
frames.  Over time, as the issues become defined within the political context, the organizational field 
becomes more structured and specialized.  If this is indeed the case, we would expect that, over time, 
groups in the South will take on more single-issue agendas.  If, however, global processes are encouraging 
multi-issue frames, then such consolidation is not likely. 
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between these groups, bringing important resources to movements.  And finally, they 
encourage the diffusion of models of collective action that include contentious politics 
(see Tarrow 2001).  To the extent that IGOs create opportunities for movements to gain 
advantages in their attempts to influence state behaviors, they encourage the formation of 
new organizations.   
 While some transnational association may simply be a response to opportunities 
created by the institutionalization of inter-governmental relations, we also find in the 
literature substantial evidence to support the argument that transnational activist networks 
are catalysts for change in inter-governmental relations.  They do not merely await 
opportunities for transnational mobilization, but they have actively sought to create and 
expand those opportunities.  For instance, Chatfield (1997) finds connections between 
transnational peace activism with the formation of both the League of Nations and the 
United Nations.  Smith (1995) documents the central role of transnational human rights 
activists in shaping the international human rights regime.  Not only did they help to 
expand definitions of human rights violations and to strengthen the mechanisms for 
sanctioning human rights violators, but they also helped to institutionalize a role for civil 
society actors in global political processes (Willetts 2000).  And numerous scholars have 
identified transnational activist influence in the expansion of international law and norms 
(See, e.g., Friedman, Clark, and Hochstetler Forthcoming; Keck 1998; Price 1998; Risse, 
Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).  Thus, we have a strong history of activism that aims to exploit 
and expand institutional openings.  
 This history of transnational advocates’ relationships to inter-governmental 
institutions suggests that regionalization of transnational organizations might reflect the 
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role that civil society groups play to bridge local and global policy processes.  TSMOs 
are among the only actors that show how national and local interests are impacted by 
international institutions and propose strategies for influencing those processes.   
As the number of transnational activists grows, and as these activists expand their role in 
global politics, they might be recognizing a need to ‘fill in’ some of the gaps between 
local and global level organizing.  While activists recognize the need to have 
representation near the sites of global decision making such as Brussels, Geneva, and 
New York, they also demand opportunities for democratic participation in policy debates, 
and they want organizations that are responsive to members’ interests and needs 
(Moghadam 2000 :82, note 19; Polletta 2002).  Organizational structures that can help 
serve as intermediaries between global and local sites of collective action may help 
reduce these tensions.   
 Such an interpretation would be consistent with the expectations of world culture 
theorists (see especially Boli, Loya and Loftin 1999; see also, Frank 2000; Meyer et al. 
1997).  In their view, regional structures facilitate the aggregation of diverse interests of 
local actors in order to more effectively integrate local and regional interests into global-
level negotiations.  They make it easier-- in particular, for groups whose language or 
historical experiences differ most dramatically from the dominant, Western-influenced 
world culture-- to define their interests within the world cultural framework and to devise 
effective strategies for fostering their regional interests.  Indeed, inter-governmental 
conferences in the UN especially encourage region-specific organizing through 
regionally-based preparatory meetings for major global conferences and through their 
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emphasis on balancing regional representation in their formal structures and negotiation 
processes.   
 Clearly political processes at the global level are affecting the ways activists 
organize across national borders.  The 1990s more than any other decade was one for 
United Nations global conferences, and at least half a dozen such conferences took place 
during the decade.  These conferences encouraged transnational mobilizing by opening 
spaces (however small) for citizen input into global political negotiations.  Organizers 
took great advantage of these, and unprecedented numbers of activists participated in 
these meetings.  United Nations negotiating contexts encouraged efforts among non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to build broad alliances and to generate consensus 
around key principles and demands. Governments often used regional meetings to 
cultivate regional consensus positions that would increase their influence on the overall 
conference agenda.  Using the same logic, NGOs made use of regional caucuses during 
their meetings that paralleled official UN conferences.  They also turned increasingly to 
regional NGO meetings as more activists expanded both their understandings of UN 
negotiating processes and their skills for influencing them (Riles 2001).   
 Southern activists found themselves at a disadvantage in many of these 
conferences, lacking the lobbying and organizing experience as well as the resources and 
facility with UN working languages (Krut 1997).  But in the course of participating in 
UN Conferences, and along with their counterparts in the global North, many Southern 
activists learned how to advocate for their interests in inter-governmental forums (Clark, 
Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Riles 2001; Snyder 2003).  This learning involved 
attempts to improve strategies for influencing global political arenas.  For instance, many 
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groups learned to mobilize well in advance of global conferences in order to influence the 
conference preparatory committee meetings or “prepcoms,” where much of the work of 
framing the negotiating text and principal aims of the conference was done.  Many also 
took part in both UN-led and NGO-organized regional meetings and caucuses.  Regional 
organizing allows activists with similar interests and political environments to come to 
some common understanding of their collective interests with regard to a particular UN 
meeting.  As was also true in inter-governmental contexts, civil society groups’ efforts to 
prioritize and aggregate interests at the regional level would then facilitate global-level 
consensus building at global meetings (Willetts 1989).   
 We also see important changes in the 1980s and 90s in other inter-governmental 
arrangements.  Most importantly, this decade saw the consolidation of the European 
Union, with the 1991 Maastricht treaty establishing the broad parameters of regional 
cooperation and launching the European Monetary Union.  This arrangement helped 
focus regional attention at the European level, and it brought new resources for citizens’ 
groups that organized around the emerging European polity (Cullen 2003; 2004). 
Regional structures focusing on economic integration, especially the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), were key initiatives advanced throughout the 1990s, 
and these certainly served as focal points for regional transnational organizations, 
attracting new resources to support regionally based transnational organizing work.  
Outside of Europe and the Americas, however, broad-based regional integration has been 
more limited.  Any opportunities for regional organizing would have been created within 
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the framework of United Nations global conferences, which incorporated a series of 
regional prepcoms in advance of each major conference.4 
 This interpretation would suggest that regional TSMOs might be complementing 
rather than competing with the work of broader TSMOs by helping to bridge local- and 
regional- level concerns with international processes.  Regional groups provide spaces for 
activists to address the particular issues that are priorities in their locale while helping 
them identify ways to advance these interests within a more diverse global setting.  Such 
regional groups can help articulate the specific connections between global policies and 
local conditions since they do not need to appeal to the very wide range of potentially 
competing interests that trans-regional groups do.  Thus, they may be more effective than 
the more diverse, trans-regional groups are at mobilizing new constituencies into 
transnational political arenas.  In order to assess whether the regionalization of TSMOs 
reflects polarization or bridging tendencies within this organizational sector, we must 
look at how groups relate to the broader field of organizations. 
 
Coalition Dynamics 
 The notion that the regionalization of TSMO structures might reflect either 
polarization or bridging tendencies parallels Staggenborg’s (1986) finding that movement 
coalitions were formed in response to either opportunities or threats in the political 
environment.  Many of the groups we examine here are actually coalitions of 
                                                 
4 The frequency of global conferences increased dramatically during the 1990s.  UN agencies typically 
provide funding for under-resourced groups to attend these Prepcoms, further encouraging efforts to 
organize within regions around UN agendas.  By the latter part of the decade, however, interest in such 
conferences has waned, and critics cite their high costs as a reason to discontinue their regular use.  
However, a recent UN Secretariat report on “UN-Civil Society Relations” (2004) sees such conferences as 
cost-effective measures for helping integrate civil society groups into global governance processes. 
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organizations, and thus these regional TSMOs may likewise be either a jihad-like 
response to the threat that the group’s interests would be eclipsed by other voices in the 
broader alliance, or they may seek to take advantage of opportunities in the political 
environment.  If regional coalitions are forming in response to a perceived threat, then we 
should find regional groups to be insular, focusing their attention primarily within their 
own region.  Moreover, given that world culture emerged from and corresponds more 
closely to Western or Northern traditions, we would expect Southern groups to be much 
more regionally oriented than their Northern counterparts.  However, if regional 
coalitions are a response to opportunities in the political environment, we should find 
relational patterns that correspond to those opportunities.  If the political opportunities lie 
outside the region or at the global level, we would expect to find groups cultivating ties to 
actors outside their region.  If the opportunities for policy influence are regionally 
defined, then regionally oriented ties are more likely. 
 If either of the above interpretations is accurate we should expect regional 
groupings to be more common around the more contentious issues.  Activists may turn to 
regional structures either to pursue regional interests independently or to better articulate 
regional interests within a global alliance.  On issues where primary interests differ across 
the North-South divide, greater efforts are needed to build broad consensus around some 
fundamental aims.  If regional groups work to build consensus and expand 
understandings of both the issues at stake and the political processes involved, they can 
better incorporate regional concerns into a wider trans-regional platform.  If polarizing 
forces are at work, we would expect the more contentious issues to drive activists—
especially less powerless ones—to devote their energies to bolstering their own particular 
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interests and influence rather than engaging in the challenging work of building broad 
alliances around limited shared goals.  Table 2 examines the issue focuses and age of 
organizations according to their geographic scope. 
 
Table 2 Here 
 
Looking at the issue-focus of regional transnational organizations, we see that the shift 
towards more intra-regional organizing within both the global North and South may 
indeed be reflecting more deep-seated cleavages in the global polity.  In areas where the 
North-South conflict is most pronounced, i.e., where the conflict centers most directly on 
decisions about resource distribution and use, we find more intra-regional groups forming 
as opposed to trans-regional groups that include members from both North and South. 
Thus, higher percentages of South-only groups focused on development and economic 
justice, whereas a higher percentage of North-only groups focused on the environment, 
which is often portrayed as an issue that is at odds with economic development.  More 
North-only groups also focused on peace issues, perhaps because for some Southern 
groups this may be seen as a lesser priority behind immediate material needs.  The fact 
that a larger percentage of South-only groups focused on women’s issues further supports 
this interpretation, as many women’s groups tend to address the development inequities 
faced by women as a consequence of their differential legal protections (Moghadam 
2000; Subramaniam et al. 2003).  
 Although issues may divide groups, political processes and the weakness of social 
movements demands that these groups build broad coalitions and cooperate with diverse 
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groups in order to enhance their political leverage (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Lipsky 
1968).  Thus, case studies of specific campaigns have shown that both Northern and 
Southern activists have had to alter the ways that they conceptualize conflicts if they hope 
to increase their political leverage and/or legitimacy (e.g., Bob Forthcoming).  Analysts 
have documented a slow and conflict-ridden process of dialogue and re-framing of 
conflicts as activists experience new opportunities for transnational dialogue and 
exchange.  For instance, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, World 
Wildlife Fund, and Rainforest Action Network have learned, through their greater contact 
with Southern activists, to emphasize the links between environmental degradation and 
the protection of human rights (e.g., Brysk 1994; Brysk 1996; Rothman and Oliver 2002; 
Warkentin 2001). Moreover, the experiences of transnational organizations working on 
issues of environment and development especially show that interactions between 
activists in the North and South led to a process of "unmaking" of the dominant, Western 
ways of organizing societies and economies and of constructing an alternative (see also 
Macdonald 1997; Warkentin 2001:139; International Forum on Globalization 2002).   
 Because social movements must rely primarily on the voluntary efforts of 
participants, and especially because they bring costs as well as potential benefits to 
members, they must work to cultivate participants’ commitment to the movement (or the 
organizations that are part of it).  Many would argue that movements cultivate 
commitment by modeling participatory democracy in their decision-making processes.  
For instance, Francesca Polletta’s work on movements in the U.S. demonstrates how 
participatory democracy evolved in movement groups there.  She identifies “deliberative 
talk” as an essential component of this form of decision making, whereby participants air 
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their views in order to justify the selection of particular options over others and to make 
transparent the reasoning behind others’ preferences and priorities.  Deliberative talk does 
not aim to produce consensus, but it does seek to foster openness and respect among 
participants, and it provides them with a sense of ownership of collective decisions 
(Polletta 2002:7).   Annelise Riles’s study of Fijian womens’ activists illustrates this 
learning process within transnational organizations: 
 
Where delegates at previous meetings had been acrimoniously divided over 
whether structural adjustment or the Palestinian liberation were in fact ‘women’s 
issues,’ . . . at this meeting Fiji’s participants in the academic women’s networks 
from ‘the South’ who had led the fight for the expansion of what counted as 
women’s issues at previous conferences found, to their own surprise, that most of 
the European and North American attendees at their sessions were in fact converts 
to their position. (Riles 2001:182) 
 
Valentine Moghadam’s study of the emergence of transnational feminist networks in the 
mid- to late- 1980s demonstrates how such a convergence of understandings came about.  
She cites the 1985 UN Conference on Women in Nairobi as a turning point in 
transnational feminist organizing: 
 
During the decade of the 1980s […] a shift took place.  In the sociodemographic 
context of a worldwide growth in the population of educated, employed, mobile 
and politically aware women, feminist discourses and networking began to spread 
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and to take on not only an international but a transnational form.  The new 
information technologies, along with the changing and increasingly harsh 
economic environment, broadened the horizons of women's organizations, 
resulting in considerable international networking and many joint initiatives.  
Feminists from the North came to appreciate the relevance of economic 
conditions and foreign policies to women's lives, while feminists from the South 
came to recognize the pertinence of 'body politics.' (Moghadam 2000:61) 
 
For their part, activists in the global South (as well as in the former Soviet Union) benefit 
from the transnational transfer of "'the technology to unite us' [such as . . . ] techniques 
for speaking in groups, listening to each other, forming networks around a concrete issue, 
thinking strategically at the grassroots level about specific actions" (Sperling, Ferree, and 
Risman 2001: 1172; see also Rupp and Taylor 1999).  Transnational organizations help 
facilitate this kind of learning by routinizing transnational communications and 
facilitating transnational collective action of various kinds (See, e.g., Waterman 2001; 
2005). 
 The preceding discussion leads to several hypotheses growing from each of the 
two contrasting propositions I offer to explain regionalization among TSMOs.  First, the 
polarization thesis holds that global institutions privilege activists from the global North 
while complicating efforts of Southern governments and citizens to address underlying 
inequities in global policy.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H0: Regional TSMOs based in the global South – regardless of the issues they 
work on-- will maintain ties mainly or only within their own region. 
  
In contrast, the bridging thesis holds that regionalization of organizing structures results 
from the fact that international institutions incorporate practices that encourage such 
regional structures.  I argued that regional structures could be facilitating the aggregation 
of diverse interests that transnational activists seek to bring to the global agenda.  While 
internal conflicts are likely to remain, activists recognize a need to manage their 
differences in order to build broad alliances in order to advance some of their shared 
interests.  Regional structures may help them manage conflicts more effectively so that 
they can foster agreement around shared aims.  This interpretation generates the 
following alternative hypotheses: 
 
HA1: Regional TSMOs based in both the global North and South will report high 
levels of ties to trans-regional groups and to other groups outside their own 
region. 
 
HA2: The regionally based institutional openings created by the European Union 
will encourage larger numbers of regional TSMOs based in the North to report 
having only regional ties. 
 
The institutional approach I have outlined would also lead us to expect some differences 
across the diverse issues these regional TSMOs address.  In particular, we would expect 
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the policy arenas that are particular to a given issue to generate different strategic 
approaches by movement actors.  On some issues—particularly where local variation 
prevents the top-down creation of policy implementation strategies, local officials 
maintain significant authority to shape policy implementation.  On others, local officials 
may either be closed to movement input or they may be powerless to affect policy 
change.  Movement strategies correspond to these policymaking structures.   
 
HA3: Because of the sensitivity of women’s and environmental issues to local 
political and ecological contexts, regional TSMOs working on these issues will be 
more tied to regional networks than will groups working on other issues. 
 
HA4: Because economic policies and human rights standards are increasingly 
defined in universal forums such as the United Nations and World Trade 
Organization, regional TSMOs working on these issues will be more tied to trans-
regional networks than will groups working on other issues. 
 
Methods 
Data for this study are drawn from the 2000/01 edition of the Yearbook of 
International Associations.  My research team selected those international non-
governmental organizations working to promote some social or political change and 
recorded evidence about the organization’s membership, founding, structure, goals, ties 
to IGOs and other NGOs, and geographic scope.5  In addition to coding the individual 
countries in which each organization reported having members, we included a variable 
                                                 
5 Further details on the coding scheme and methods are available from the author or in Smith (2004). 
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indicating whether each organization had members in the global North (i.e., OECD 
countries) and the global South (middle- and low-income countries as classified by the 
World Bank annual Development Report).  Regional organizations are those that reported 
having members only in the global North or South.   
I selected those regional TSMOs organized around issue areas where we found 
different patterns of organizing between Northern- and Southern-based organizations (see 
table 2).  These issues included human rights, environmental protection, economic 
justice, and women’s rights.6  This subset of regional organizations consisted of 151 
organizations, or about half of all regionally organized TSMOs.  For each organization, I 
returned to the Yearbook entry to record the names of those non-governmental 
organizations with which the group reported having contact.  Each group’s list of ties 
with other international non-governmental organizations was then coded with regard to 
the type of organizational ties represented.  I recorded, for instance, if one of the major, 
prominent global organizations that work on that issue (referred to here as the “big 10”) 
was among each group’s lists of contacts.7  Codes were assigned to indicate whether each 
TSMO reported contacts with regional NGOs, cross-regional groups other than those in 
the “big ten,” faith-based NGOs working outside the relevant issue-area, and labor 
NGOs.  I also recorded whether each group indicated contact with a broad global NGO 
forum such as the CONGO (Conference of NGOs in Consultative Status with the United 
Nations, World Alliance for Citizen Participation-CIVICUS, etc.)  Because these types of 
                                                 
6 I excluded “development/empowerment” groups because of their atypical structure as well as their 
tendency to be trans-regional in practice, even if their members are located in a single region. 
7 The “big 10” refers to the groups that are very prominent for their work on a given issue, including 
Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, OXFAM, etc.  Their numbers may not equal ten, 
but they are relatively few. 
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groups work on topics relating to the overall sector of advocacy groups working in global 
political arenas, I decided to record them as a separate category of network ties.8   
  
Data 
 Table three summarizes the types of network ties for each issue-area and for all 
regional TSMOs in this analysis.  Ties to “big 10” organizations can provide groups with 
access to information about the issues on which they are working, as well as information 
about global conferences and political developments.  They might also provide resources 
of some sort—including small grants for projects, training workshops, or opportunities to 
attend meetings of other activists.  They also confer legitimacy to a local or regional 
group, certifying them as players in the international movement related to their issue 
focus.  Comparatively few groups, however, reported ties to these groups, suggesting that 
such certification either is not needed for many regional organizations, or that the 
information and resources available from these key organizations can be obtained 
through other sources.  It is also likely that, with declining communications and 
transportation costs, more groups are able to have the global reach of the “big 10” while 
remaining smaller and more responsive to the needs of their allies.  Environmental and 
economic justice groups were most likely to report ties to “big 10” groups.  This may be 
                                                 
8 Despite its value as the only comprehensive census of transnational organizations, the Yearbook certainly 
raises validity problems for social scientists.  For instance, organizational entries are compiled mainly 
through annual surveys of the organizations, with some attempt by editors to supplement these records with 
other information sources, including Web sites and cross-references among entries themselves.  So the 
completeness of entries will vary according to who in the organization completes the survey as well as the 
availability of staff time for this task.  Moreover, the strength of the relationship indicated by a reported 
link between groups cannot be determined from these data.  A link might signal daily, weekly, or monthly 
contact, or it can mean that the groups simply exchange mailings.  We can assume that whatever validity 
errors introduced by the Yearbook’s reporting methods are random, but the conclusions drawn from these 
data should be tested against other sources of data on this organizational population in order to verify their 
validity. 
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tied to the fact that advocacy work on the environment and the global economy is more 
tied to centralized forums, such as treaty review conferences or World Bank meetings, 
thus requiring global-level analyses and information available from these groups.9   
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Interestingly, women’s groups were the least likely to report ties to “big 10” groups.  This 
may be the result of feminists’ aversion to hierarchy and bureaucracy, as well as the 
sensitivity to the wide variety of local manifestations of gender-based discrimination.  It 
also is very likely related to the tendency of women’s organizations to adopt more 
informal, decentralized, network-like structures (Keck and Sikkink 1998:chapter 5; 
Subramaniam, Gupte, and Mitra 2003).  As Moghadam notes, "Today feminist groups 
and women's organizations remain rooted in national or local issues, but their vocabulary, 
strategies and objectives have much in common with each other and have taken on an 
increasingly supra-national form" (2000:61-2).   
Human rights and women’s organizations were most likely to report ties to global 
NGO forum organizations, perhaps reflecting the importance that maintaining formal 
access to UN processes and structures has for these groups.  It may also reflect a better 
correspondence of these organizations’ agendas, which tend to focus on issues of 
inclusion, democracy, and access to political institutions.  At least half of all groups 
working on every issue reported at least one tie to another regional INGO.  Human rights 
and economic justice groups were the only organizations reporting ties with both 
                                                 
9 While these “big 10” groups are not the only ones providing access to relevant information on their issues, 
they are more likely to have resources and regional presence that make them readily available to resource-
poor groups. 
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transnational labor and faith-based INGOs.10  Regional women’s and environmental 
groups did not report any cross-sectoral ties.  While organized within regions, about half 
of all regional TSMOs maintain ties that cross the North-South divide.11  Groups working 
on the environment and women’s issues were the least likely to report such ties, with just 
40% and 46% of all groups working on these respective issues reporting any cross-
regional tie.  Human rights and economic justice groups reported similar levels of ties to 
cross-regional groups.  About a quarter of all regional TSMOs reported ties within their 
region only, and environmental groups were most likely to report such ties (37%).  In 
contrast, economic justice groups were least likely to report ties within a single region 
only (16%).12 
 
Ties to IGOs.  Groups reporting any cross-regional tie were somewhat more 
likely to report ties to intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council, Food and Agriculture Organization, or the European 
Union.  For all of the groups in this study, the average number of IGO ties was 3.19 for 
groups with a cross-regional tie and 1.94 for groups without such ties.  The average 
number of ties to international NGOs was 6.28 and 3.72, respectively.13  Comparisons 
                                                 
10 This does not mean that the groups did not maintain ties to other groups that are organized nationally.  
The Yearbook reports only international NGO ties. 
11 For most groups, this is indicated by at least one tie to a cross-regional group.  For a small number of 
groups, however, it reflects a tie to a regional organization outside their own region. 
12 A collaborative, multi-city study of demonstrators at the February 15, 2003 global antiwar protests (See 
Mario Diani’s chapter in Walgrave and Rucht, Forthcoming) also found important differences between 
women’s and environmental activists and human rights/global justice activists.  Diani found that women’s 
rights and environmental activists reported different overlapping organizational memberships from those of 
other demonstrators.  These findings might suggest a reconfiguration of the ideologies and frames used by 
new social movements (cf. Kriesi et al. 1995). 
13 Significance level for difference of means test (2-tailed) for IGO ties was < .01 for IGOs (t=2.753) and < 
.05 for INGO ties (t=2.352) 
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across North and South revealed patterns consistent with the larger TSMO population, 
namely that Southern groups tended to report more ties to both IGOs and INGOs. 
 When we examine the ties to international governmental and nongovernmental 
organizations within each issue area the general patterns hold, but we find no statistically 
significant differences between groups with cross-regional ties and those without for the 
human rights, environment, and economic justice organizations.  However, there were 
statistically significant differences in the comparisons of women’s groups.  Women’s 
organizations with cross-regional ties reported significantly more ties to both 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations than did those regional groups 
whose ties remained within a single region.14  This difference probably reflects the series 
of major UN conferences on women marking the International Women’s Decade (1975, 
1980, and 1985), which facilitated contacts with the UN and its agencies as well as with 
other local, national, and international NGOs (Subramaniam et al, 2003:346).15 
 What do these patterns say with regard to our hypotheses?  First, the greater 
numbers of ties to IGOs and INGOs among groups with trans-regional ties suggests the 
importance of these institutions as potential allies or otherwise as important for these 
groups’ efforts to advance their social change goals.  Regional groups, however, would 
be expected to have fewer ties, given their narrower scope and the smaller numbers of 
potential IGO and INGO contacts.  While these observations provide some support for 
the hypotheses related to the bridging thesis, we should note that the fact that Southern-
                                                 
14 For the subset of women’s organizations, the average number of IGO ties was 3.69 for groups with at 
least one cross-regional tie and 1.38 for groups without such ties.  For INGOs, these averages were 5.92 
and 2.31, respectively.  As is shown in tables 4 and 5, South-based groups were more likely to maintain 
cross-regional ties than were Northern groups. 
15 Subramaniam and her colleagues note that the participation of local staff of women’s groups in 
international meetings "facilitated building informal networks across national boundaries, and provided 
renewed impetus to the movement in India" (2003: 346). 
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based TSMOs reported significantly more ties to other actors in their environment is not 
consistent with the null hypothesis that groups in the South would be more regionally-
focused in their relations with other groups. 
 
 North-South Comparisons.  The next two analyses compare regional TSMOs in 
the global North and South to see if these groups differ in the extent to which they are 
inward or outward looking with respect to their relational ties.  Given the greater 
institutionalization of regional inter-governmental relations in Europe, and the relative 
absence of substantial, broad-based inter-governmental organizations in the global South, 
we would expect to find different patterns of network ties.  Specifically, we should find 
stronger regional connections among Northern groups, and more trans-regional ties 
among regional groups in the South.  Because of the predominant influence of the United 
States and other OECD countries, Southern NGOs must build connections to a broad base 
of allies in order to enhance their organizational effectiveness (see, e.g., Levering 1997 
Anheier and Katz 2004).  Moreover, the relative lack of domestic sources of funding in 
the global South means that Southern groups are forced to look outside their national and 
regional borders for financial assistance.  They may seek access to private foundations or 
international agencies through ties to groups outside their region, or they might make 
such connections in the course of their fund-raising efforts (Bob 2001; forthcoming; Riles 
2001).   
 Table four reports the ties of regional TSMOs to other INGOs working within 
their own region.  It also indicates the percentage of groups in each issue area that 
reported only regional ties. With the exception of environmental groups where North and 
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South patterns were similar, higher percentages of North-based regional TSMOs reported 
any or only regional ties than did South-based organizations.  Again, these differences 
were significant only for women’s groups.  We find statistically significant differences 
between women’s groups in the North and in the South.  Our expectation (Ha3) that both 
women’s and environmental issues would be most regionally oriented is borne out only 
for Northern groups and for Southern environmental groups.  While women’s issues 
attracted the highest level of within-region networking by Northern groups, this issue had 
the lowest level of within-region networking by Southern groups.  This might reflect 
closed opportunity structures at the local level for Southern women’s groups to influence 
relevant policy structures.  The fact that more Southern women’s groups maintain trans-
regional ties suggests that they may be pursuing a “boomerang” strategy of going outside 
the state to bring international pressure on national and local officials (Keck and Sikkink 
1998; cf. Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002). 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The findings reported in table four are largely consistent with the expectations of the 
bridging hypothesis outlined above.  If polarization processes were at work, we would 
expect a greater regional emphasis among Southern groups.  However, we still must 
account for the fact that environmental groups showed no real North-South differences in 
levels of regional organizing, even as environmental issues attracted comparatively 
higher levels of regional organizing than did some other issues.  This may reflect a 
tendency for environmental organizations to mobilize around territorially defined 
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environmental threats, or it may reflect the nature of environmental policy arenas.  
Environmental policy is highly sensitive to local variations in ecosystems and societal 
structures.  This may mean that environmental activists have more access to local 
environmental policy makers or that they must target their efforts on more local 
officials.16  For instance, our study includes ecosystem-focused groups like the 
International Commission for the Protection of the Alps and the International Association 
for Forest Resources Management. 
 Table five reports the percentages of groups in each issue area reporting at least 
one cross-regional tie.  Contrary to the expectations of the polarization thesis, we find 
that Southern groups outpaced their Northern counterparts in their percentage of cross-
regional ties two-to-one.17    
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Consistent with hypothesis A4, Environmental and women’s groups in both North and 
South were least likely to report cross-regional ties, while human rights and economic 
justice organizations reported comparable levels of such ties.  These patterns suggest that 
the ecological focus of environmental groups leads them to concentrate their organizing 
efforts within territorially defined regions, and that the tendency of women’s group 
strategies to emphasize relationships among individuals and groups lead these two types 
                                                 
16 Other studies of environmental movements found that they had comparatively greater access to local 
institutional arenas (McCarthy, Smith and Zald 1996). 
17 Of course, the larger number of Northern groups means that their numbers are generally higher than their 
Southern counterparts in many categories, even though the percentages are lower. 
 29 




 I began this paper by raising the question about whether or not the transnational 
activism witnessed in recent years is likely to be deepened and sustained.  To investigate 
this, I examined data on the organizations that are important (though not the only) actors 
in the mobilization of global protests, transnational social movement organizations 
(TSMOs).  I explored two opposing explanations for why transnational social movement 
organizations have increasingly been organized along regional lines, asking if this trend 
reflects a reversal or a deepening of earlier globalizing tendencies within the field of 
transnational activism.  On the one hand, regionalization may be a response to the 
frustrations and limitations that can result from attempts to build broad coalitions that 
include groups with very diverse interests and capabilities.  Given that the North-South 
cleavage has proven to be a key roadblock to most major inter-governmental agreements 
since the early 1990s, it would not be surprising to find civil society groups polarized 
along similar lines.  Thus, regionalization might be an organizational response to the 
threats to regional interests caused by attempts to build alliances among very diverse 
groups with varying abilities to influence policy processes and outcomes. 
 On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the relative powerlessness of 
social movement organizations demands that they find ways to overcome differences in 
order to build the broad coalitions needed to influence global politics.  This is particularly 
true since global institutions like the United Nations are organized around principles of 
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equal representation and democracy, thereby encouraging efforts at inclusion.  The 
better-resourced and more politically empowered minority in the global North must 
mobilize support in the “majority world” of the global South in order to enhance the 
legitimacy of their claims.  The most legitimate groups in these settings are ones that can 
truly claim to represent the interests of people from many different countries.   
 The hypothesis I used to test the polarization thesis—i.e., that we would find more 
regional ties among Southern groups—is not supported by these data.  Rather than being 
less connected to groups outside their region, regional TSMOs based in the South were 
more connected to transregional groups and to IGOs than were their Northern 
counterparts. The evidence here suggests that regional TSMOs are more likely to be 
helping to bridge local and transnational politics by aggregating interests at the regional 
level.  Thus, we can say that regionalization more likely reflects an organizational 
response to the opportunities created by global institutions than an abandonment of 
efforts to overcome major divisions in global civil society.   
 As they work to influence global negotiations, many activists are likely to see a 
need to “fill in” some of the structural gaps between local and national organizers and 
global level political processes.  More localized organizational structures can be more 
responsive to local needs, thus helping to aggregate interests and articulate the 
preferences of people from a given region in a way that facilitates global-level consensus 
building.  This can give new groups a unique organizing role, or niche, that limits their 
need to compete for members and resources with larger, more established groups (e.g., 
Minkoff 1995; Murphy, this volume).  The UN global conferences, and the incentives 
those conferences provided for improving regional integration, appear to be a key factor 
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shaping this organizational pattern.  The fact that the World Social Forum—the major 
global gathering of civil society groups that has met annually in Porto Alegre, Brazil and 
in Mumbai, India since 2001—has generated parallel regional and local “Social Forums,” 
demonstrates the appeal of and the demand for more localized dialogue within a global 
framework.  Within the Social Forum, activists have been explicit about the need to hold 
more localized forums in order to integrate a more diverse array of voices, even as they 
stress the importance of the global forum event (Smith et al. 2004).  As scholar-activist 
Walden Bello observes:  
 
[O]ne of the main reasons the Porto Alegre process is gaining such momentum is 
precisely that is provides a venue where movements and organizations can find 
ways of working together despite their differences. While the usual ultra-leftist 
groups remain defiantly outside it, the Porto Alegre process in Brazil, Europe, and 
India has brought to the forefront the common values and aspirations of a variety 
of political traditions and tendencies. The Porto Alegre process may be the main 
expression of the coming together of a movement that has been wandering for a 
long time in the wilderness of fragmentation and competition. The pendulum, in 
other words, may now be swinging to the side of unity, driven by the sense that in 
an increasingly deadly struggle against unilateralist militarization and aggressive 
corporate globalization, movements have no choice but to hang together, or they 
will hang separately.  (Bello 2003, emphasis mine) 
 
 32 
 The strengthening of regional inter-governmental institutions also contributes to 
the regionalization of TSMOs.  For instance, the European Union is the strongest regional 
IGO, and its role in regional affairs was greatly enhanced during the decade when we also 
witnessed a growth of regional TSMOs.  European Union policies and structures 
encouraged groups to aggregate interests across Europe and articulate them in ways that 
were most likely to influence European decision-making.  Regional groups focused on 
the EU polity do not provide evidence for a polarization thesis, since they are seeking to 
aggregate a sub-set of global interests in a narrower political arena.  Southern activists 
lack a comparable regional structure.18 
 Data on the ties that regional TSMOs reported with other non-governmental 
organizations allowed us to assess the extent to which these groups operate solely within 
their own regions and to what extent they maintain ties outside their region.  The analysis 
showed that groups in the global South maintained more cross-regional ties than their 
Northern counterparts.  At the same time, Northern groups were significantly more likely 
to report ties only to groups within their own region.  Consistent with our alternative 
hypotheses 3 and 4, an institutional explanation makes sense of the variation we find 
across different issues.  Issues with more local sensitivities and access (women’s rights 
and environmental issues) fostered more regionally based ties, while issues that are 
governed at a more universal level (economic justice and human rights) generated more 
cross-regional ties.   
 In summary, the data best support the theory that the regionalization of TSMOs is 
the result of the opportunity structures of international political institutions.  New 
                                                 
18 Although this study suggests that, if policy makers are concerned with strengthening civil society actors 
in the global South, then efforts to support or promote regional inter-governmental institutions in that 
region would help advance this agenda. 
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opportunities in the European Union encouraged Northern groups to mobilize along 
regional lines in order to defend and/or advance social change goals within that 
institutional framework.  However, Southern groups have no comparable regional 
intergovernmental structure.  The regionalization of these groups, then, is more likely a 
response to the opportunities of United Nations global conferences and related initiatives.  
These encourage Southern activists to organize within their region so that they can best 
advance regional interests within a political context that is-- politically if not numerically-
-  largely dominated by Northern organizations and activists.  They also encourage 
Southern groups to work with their Northern counterparts.  By bringing to global forums 
positions that have been developed through regional dialogues, Southern groups have a 
better chance of influencing the consensus-building efforts of civil society groups.  The 
jihad or polarization thesis, in contrast, would anticipate that Southern groups would be 
more particularistic and insular in their focus.  Rather than signaling a North-South 
polarization in global civil society that mirrors this major cleavage in inter-state relations, 
regionalization seems to be the result of efforts to better bridge North and South within 
global political contexts.  In places where regional IGOs are strong, such as Europe, 
regionally based organizing is encouraged as a means of integrating diverse populations 
around a shared, regional identity and political strategy.  This study, then, supports the 
arguments of world culture and political process theory that transnational and global 
institutions affect patterns of social relations in ways that reinforce the institutionalization 
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Table 1:  Regionally Organized vs. Trans-Regionally Organized Groups 
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Big 10 10.5% 26.8% 21.6%   3.7% 16.8% 
Global Forum 18.4   4.9   0 22.2 10.5 
Regional tie 60.5 61.0 51.4 51.9 56.6 
Labor tie 15.8   0   5.4   0   5.6 
Faith-based tie 15.8   0 10.8   0   7.0 
Any cross-reg tie 58.5 40.5 57.5 46.4 51.0 
Regional ties only 22.0 37.5 16.2 25.0 25.3 
Categories of network ties are not mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Table 4: Within-Region Ties Among Regional TSMOs 



























































67   7 
(15) 





▪T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .15 level. 
*T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .05 level. 






Table 5: Regional TSMOs with Any Cross-Regional Tie 



























▪T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .15 level. 
▪▪T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .10 level. 
*T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .05 level. 
** T-test of mean difference between North and South (2-tailed) significant at .01 level. 
 
 
 
